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This article explores the criticalness of decentralized governance as a solution towards service delivery challenges 
experienced by urban centres. But, in Zimbabwe centre-local relations are a phenomenological reflection of a 
tendency  towards  (re)centralization  than  decentralization.  This  is  clearly  visible  in  the  widespread  political 
interference by central government’s Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing in the 
administrative affairs of urban councils. The results from a survey of a sample of fifty-two respondents on the 
Zimbabwean urban governance status revealed that issues of political interference revolved around the firing of 
legitimate councils and mayors, control of all council reforms including generation of funds, politicking in the 
chambers, unlawful appointments, and the use of commissions. Constitutional amendment has been cited as a big 
step towards political interference in urban governance of the country. 
Keywords:decentralisation,  citizenship,  sustainable  development,  urban  politics,  constitution,  financial 
management, interference  
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the level and extent of the Zimbabwean central government interference into the 
urban  councils'  affairs  indicating  a  propensity  to  (re)centralization  and  the  implications  it  has  on 
governance (Oyono, 2004; Raufu and Lindsay 2009). This comes from the background that the country, 
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(Nkomo, 2002; MLGPWNH, 2004). But economic and institutional challenges faced by the government 
led  to  the  reformation  of  the  existing  policies  and  legislation  then  (cf.  Cochrane,  2007),  ultimately 
reducing the types of local authorities to a dichotomous arrangement of rural-district councils and urban 
councils. This development was cherished by many countries in Africa as an advanced system of 
administering local affairs (UCAZ, 2003b). Local authorities by their nature provide lower level structures 
for democratic (political) debates, social and economic development (Mawhood (ed), 1993). They are a 
critical platform for debating local issues by the instrument of representative democracy (SALGA, 1997). 
Councillors are elected every four years (UCAZ, 2003a; GoZ, 1996). A full council, as an institution 
composed of councillors and employees of an urban council makes resolutions and by-laws - key tools 
for managing local government affairs. Council resolutions, of equivalency to policy, are the source of 
council vision, plans, programmes and projects (UCAZ, 2003a). It is the creation and administration of 
such policies that can bring and perpetuate a system of good governance in the management of urban 
councils (MLGPWNH, 2004). Zimbabwe’s local government system is an exact replica of the British 
style.  Redlich in Dearlove (1979), referring to Britain argues that as with the national parliament (grand 
legislative  assembly)  so  are  the  local  councils  (petite  parliament)  whereby  local  citizens  elect  the 
councillors who have to work under the censorship of local opinion and execute their commands by the 
instrument of the technocratic professionals the councils hire (MHLG 1967; cf. Magnusson, 2006).  
Since the year 2000 central government uncalled for interventions have manifested in the form of 
increased firing of legally elected urban councils (e.g. of Mutare, Harare, Chitungwiza) by the Minister of 
Local  Government,  National  Housing  and  Urban  Development  (MLGPWNH)  replacing  these  by 
appointed District and provincial administrators who report directly to central government (cf. Herald, 
2008),.  The  'residual'  mayors  and  councils  have  been  impelled  to  report  to  provincial  and  district 
administrators who, by their nature, are civil servants. The civil servants have adopted a confrontational 
rather than a collaborative approach to the management of urban councils contrary to the provisions of 
the existing legislation (Kamete, 2002). This is in contravention of the principles of decentralization and 
good governance (Johnson and Minis, undated; Joint UNDP-Government of Germany, 1999; Prakash, 
2002; Magnusson, 2006). It is lamentable that in this same period of the messy reality of governance in 
the country the economic meltdown in the country has rendered most of the councils un-creditworthy to 
local and international banks, leaving the borrowing powers by urban councils in the hands of central 
government to the detriment of rapid decision-making let alone service delivery (cf. Osiche, 2007). 
Almost all towns and cities in Zimbabwe have been grappling with raising sufficient revenues for capital 
and recurrent expenditures (local budget deficits) over the past almost decade (2000-2009). Multilateral 
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tensions between the country and the international community due to the challenges including but not 
limited to: the land question, governance and political intolerance of the opposition. There has been a 
conflict of view and ideology, approach between The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and 
Zimbabwe  African  National  Union-  Patriotic  Party  (ZANU-PF).    As  the  ruling  party  fired  the  urban 
councils spearheaded by the opposition there is no doubt that such is evidence of political interests 
subduing the cause of democratic good governance (Kamete, 2002; 2003; 2006; cf. Oyono, 2004). 
Decentralization  is  imperative  for  the  effective  and  efficient  pillars  of  urban  councils’  financial 
management:  
￿  revenue assignment, dealing with generation and mobilisation funds,  
￿  expenditure assignment, controlling the utilization of budgeted funds,  
￿  borrowing, supplementing shortage of funds through loans from banks, public and private 
creditors and  
￿  financial transfers involving grants and loans from central government (Davey, 1996).  
To become better cities, urban governance structures need to ensure that the urban environment they 
create and maintain for their citizens is socially just, ecologically sustainable, politically participatory, 
economically productive and culturally vibrant (Magnusson, 2006). Yet, the Zimbabwean constitution is 
unclear on the local government system and authority boundaries. Although the Urban Councils Act 
details the urban councils’ management procedures and defines the powers of the minister also, the 
same minister is the custodian of the Act and therefore can amend the Act and at will (MLGPWNH, 
2004; GoZ, 1996). This can be detrimental to standard good service delivery in the urban areas.  
2. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS  
Zimbabwe  comprises  twenty  two  (22)  urban  local  authorities  ranging  from  town  boards  to  cities; 
administered by one piece of legislation, the Urban Councils Act with the Ministry of Local Government, 
National  Housing  and  Urban  Development  supervising  the  implementation  of  this  legislation  (GoZ, 
1996).  The  researchers  randomly  picked  three  cities  (Harare,  Mutare  and  Bulawayo)  and  one 
municipality for political and economic considerations. The selected sample (the four urban centres) 
constitutes about 18% of the universe. Respondents were stratified into employees and councillors (the 
policy makers and supervisors of employees) first. Secondly convenience sampling was used to pick on 
all heads of departments (a group of respondents which sits in crucial councils meetings, plan for 
respective departments, and having access to the relevant information needed for the research). The 
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sample of 49 respondents was picked from a population of 130. The final composition of the sample as 
determined by those who responded to the questionnaire and those who were interviewed was as 
follows:  
￿  councillors (11),  
￿  reluctant informants 3,  
￿  employees (23),  
￿  Ministry of Local Government officers (3),  
￿  Urban Councils Association officers (2), urban councils legal advisors (3) and  
￿  public relations officers (4).  
At the time of collecting data Harare had no councillors having been fired by the Minister of Local 
Government. Commissioners were used in lieu of councillors. Data were collected through interviews, 
questionnaires and documentary reviews and triangulation was possible using the three methods (cf. 
Best and Khan, 1993; Cochran, 1977; Cohen and Manion 1986) 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Local government provides a means for the ordinary citizen to take part in public affairs at local level 
(Mawhood ed, 1993; Davey, 1996; Cloete, 1978). Citizens have an opportunity through their vote to 
exercise a decisive influence on the general direction of local affairs. Segalo in IULA (1997: 690) argues 
for decentralized institutions like urban councils citing the pillars of: 
￿  Citizens' contribution towards what directly affects their lives.  
￿  Reform initiatives by the citizens. 
￿  Consequential participation that gives pride in environment and enhancement of community 
awareness by the citizens.  
￿  Improvement in the flexibility and speed in planning and delivery.   
￿  Meaningful engagement of communities in the process of sustainable development.   
Yet, those at the centre argue that power should reside in themselves for a range of reasons: they fear 
that diffusion of power will threaten national unity and stability and equitable development; that the 
transfer of power will cause loss of status and influence; that the equitable distribution of power and 
benefits calls for commitment and political will of the highest order; that  central bureaucrats thrive on 
certainty that will only be secured through direct control of power and resources; that other levels of 
government  lack  the  capacity  to  perform  the  functions  that  must  be  performed  adequately(AULA 
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preferred  forms  of  decentralisation  because  they  allow  for  genuine  decongestion  of  the  central 
government as decision-making powers and control of necessary resources are transferred to localities 
where they are expeditiously exercised to deal with local problems. The service provision function has 
been identified as the raison d’etre for the existence of local governments. Conversely, the extent to 
which  any  local  government  is  able  to  provide  services  is  highly  political,  depending  on  the 
administrative mechanisms in place. The primary great advantage of local government lies in the power 
of the availability and canto of the local knowledge it possesses; local area and population is small 
enough for the officials as well as the councillors to know it  intimately. In  the smallest authorities 
ratepayers  and  councillors  or  officials  interact  well  even  at  personal  levels  giving  an  intimate 
atmosphere of local administration. There is little excuse for any sense of remoteness; these close links 
between the council and the public usually foster some sense of true democracy akin to that which 
governed the City States of Ancient Greece.  
Sharma  in  IULA  (1997)  affirm  that  democracy  and  decentralization  is  more  meaningful  with  local 
government engaging effective participation of people at that level in the process of governance and in 
the sphere of accountability. Sharma however bemoans the present nature of governance in most 
African countries where democracy, decentralization, local government and public accountability remain 
distant goals and in some cases with rhetorical advocacy and adoption of the tenets for purposes of 
stabilizing  legitimacy  of  political  authority.  To  strike  a  balance  between  centralization  and 
decentralization of authority and  functions, a system of democratic decentralization is a necessary 
precondition.  The  World  Bank  in  UNCHS  (1996:161)  stresses  that  local  government  could  play  a 
greater role if allowed  more autonomy and regular, independent sources of revenue, especially in 
managing the expanding urban networks that link the towns to their hinterlands. In rural areas local 
services, such as water supply, could be better run at the communal level provided genuine delegation 
of responsibilities is availed.  
Local governments are strategic partners in the decentralization process: on one hand, receiving the 
transfer of tasks and responsibilities from central government, on the other hand, creating supportive 
environment for development and resource mobilisation for the implementation of new infrastructure 
services on a scale that is mostly far beyond their capacity. Strengthening the institutional, financial and 
professional capacity for the implementation of the relevant policies becomes requirement that must not 
be obviated in any way. Sharma (1995:53) further reiterates that effectiveness of decentralization and 
capacities of local level organizations are often limited due to the problems related to policy formulation, 
implementation, monitoring, guidance and vertical-horizontal two-way communication. In this aspect, the 
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their effectiveness.  Museveni  in (UNDP 2000: 182) argues that decentralization measures taken in 
Uganda have a thrust of undoing the harm inflicted on the local systems of governance by centralisation 
by unleashing local initiative, invigorating the local democratic process towards sustaining development 
and enhancing local capabilities for self-governance and delivery of service. The guiding philosophy in 
the whole process has been that devolution of power, functions and resources will help achieve albeit 
cheaply, higher performance rates in literacy, life expectancy, cash and food crop production and other 
indicators of social development. 
UNCHS  (1996)  stresses  that  the  proponents  of  decentralization  recognize  the  diversity  between 
localities i.e. demand for public services varies from place to place both in quantity and quality, hence 
the decentralization of the provision for these services can ensure an efficient response to the services 
demand, in the first place. Secondly, locally-financed and provided services can be very cost effective 
given  the  input  by  community  –based  or  voluntary  sector  organizations.  Thirdly,  institutions  and 
organisation are made to account for their actions. This boosts confidence among actors.  Lastly, the 
interdependency and indivisibility of most services provided (water, sewer, roads, etc) provide a relevant 
platform for local government coordination of these services. Despite a diversity of combinations of 
decentralization  in  Africa,  each  country  has  retained  some  peculiar  features.  For  instance,  three 
patterns of relational or structural arrangements are distinct:  
￿  the  pure  devolution  pattern  (typical  case  of  Nigeria)  where  an  attempt  was  made  to       
disband deconcentrated structure; 
￿  the  juxtaposed arrangement (where deconcentrated and devolved institutions exist side by 
side in a rather complex set of interrelations as in most African  countries; and 
￿  the  integrated  arrangement  pattern  (whereby  all  institutions  are  at  the  same  time        
deconcentrated and devolved as found in the Benin Republic).  
Local governments should also be viewed as training grounds for democracy given their provision for 
political  debate  and  argumentation  over  issues.  Also  politicians  are  so  trained,  indoctrinated  and 
developed that with time they become gurus not only in their party ideologies but also procedures of 
political debates with some even rising to upper echelons of regional and national politics. They also 
learn to adapt to needs from 'below' and form 'above' (vertical integration); through interchange of ideas 
from other places they tap into lateral integration; and by sharing the different ideas they become versed 
with different thematic (geographic, cultural, ethnic and historic) frameworks. Enemuo in UNDP (2000) 
opines that the interests of  the central government have dominated local government policies and 
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citizens. As a result, the role and function of local government has been greatly distorted with citizens 
viewing local authorities not as their institutions but as central government organizations (organs of 
state power rather than institutions setup by the people, run by the people and for the people). This is 
confirmed by the observation that the central government tends to treats local authorities as tools 
created for its use and abuse (the instrumental debate of governance). This has frequently, seen local 
governments  being  taken  as  experimental  space  for  new  ideas  and  practices  and  sometimes 
exploratory policy decisions (Oyono 2004; Hyden, Olowu, and Ogendo, 2000).  
A managerialist perspective of decentralization sees citizens as subject to trigger by the leadership of 
some elite figure to realise their full capacity for action (Davar, 1996). The extent to which those in 
policy- making positions believe that others possess initiative capacities, determines the extent to which 
authority  and  responsibility  are  delegated  and  decentralization  occurs.  Koontz  in  Davar  (1996) 
complements this assertion stating that the manager (for example, Ministers of Local Government) has 
a quintessential role and function of an environment creator and stir up groups and individuals, towards 
attainment  of  group  purpose.  Literature  shows  that  people  are  more  likely  to  be  committed  to  a 
development project or programme if they are involved in its planning and preparation; they identify with 
it  and  own  it  (Prakash,  2002;  Oyono  2004;  Hyden,  Olowu,  and  Ogendo,  2000).  Right  action  and 
decisions at the right place and time tend to cultivate responsible behaviour and good governance. 
Overall,  despite  the  argument  for  a  centralized  system  of  governance,  decentralization  has  been 
supported as a better system of modern and democratic governments (Oyono 2004; Hyden, Olowu, and 
Ogendo, 2000). Decentralization allows the public to participate in almost all issues that affect their 
social lives hence facilitates good governance. 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The overriding assumption in this paper the period 1980 through to 2008 was a remarkable stage-
setting time for the mooting, development and trial of the decentralisation initiative in Zimbabwe. From 
the mid-nineties to 2000 government interference in urban local affairs fundamentally increased. This 
development led to a deep-seated recentralization trend. This section of the paper attempts to show the 
disposition of  the interference by central government into local government affairs.  Although some 
drastic changes have resulted with the formation of the all-inclusive government in 2009, much analysis 
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Centralisation of Water and Sewer in Zimbabwe  
June 2006, saw the takeover of water and sewer by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) as 
a directive from the Minister of Local Government. This saw Morton Jaffray Water Works Plant and its 
sub-systems being handed over to this central government creation. The rationale by the Minister for 
this decision of transfer was cited as incapacity by the urban councils to provide adequate water to 
residents. Yet, empirical evidence show that delivery in this area from the period 2000 to 2008 never 
changed for the better. In effect, the supply of water in Harare became more erratic with the takeover. 
ZINWA oftentimes failed to secure chemicals for water purification. There was also constant bursting of 
major water pipelines. The old infrastructure at Morton Jaffray compounded the whole situation.  It was 
revealed in the study that the City of Harare was not compensated for its infrastructure, transferred to 
ZINWA.  
The action of the transfer, on the whole, deprived the urban local authorities of their traditional revenue 
sources. The zenith of ZINWA incapacity manifested in the widespread of cholera outbreak whose 
cradle was the city, particularly Budiriro high-density suburb in Harare. Possible causes of the cholera 
outbreak, as suggested by the respondents included but not limited to:  
￿  lack of supply of clean water in urban areas,  
￿  bursting of the sewerage systems/ failure by administrators to maintain the all-important 
infrastructure,  
￿  lack of water for flashing in toilets,  
Some respondents cited conflicts in the council chambers, politicking, mismanagement, bankruptcy as 
the plausible causes for the outbreak of the disease.  The general deterioration of the health delivery 
systems was also cited as a cause. Experts indicated the contradiction of the Millennium Development 
Goal  (MDG)  Six  which  is  summarised  as  “combat  the  impact  of  water  borne  diseases,  such  as 
diarrhoea”. 
Ministerial issuance of directives and circulars  
Directives are therefore a major tool used by central government in meddling with issues of a local 
nature  (Herald,  2008).  These  machinations  traded  good  governance  for  political  advantages  and 
because of this central government therefore came very heavy on urban councils thereby thwarting any 
remaining elements of freedom, good governance, commitment, initiative, etc among councillors and 
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￿  The Minister gave statements to reverse Harare City Council’s decision on reinstating city 
council  employees  (the  Director  of  Housing,  Engineering  Director  and  City  Treasurer) 
illegally fired during the management of a commission.   
￿  The Minister of Local Government was the chief determinant of surcharges and rates. Urban 
councils could not increase surcharges or rates without getting permission from the ministry.  
￿  Divide and rule tactics as a result of bickering or politicking and endless clashes of senior 
managers at Town House (The Herald, 2006) 
￿  The majority of urban councils were charging sub-economic rates to consumers because of 
ministerial interventions (The Manica Post, 2006). 
￿  Firing of councillors. 
￿  Abolition of the office of the executive mayor.  
￿  Introducing District Administrators and metropolitan governors (specifically for Harare and 
Bulawayo) in urban areas.  
￿  Central government failed  to honour payment of  its debts even in the Zimbabwe dollar 
currency (abandoned in 2009). Respondents argued that with the economic meltdown, the 
ministries no longer care about their indebtedness to city councils (see Table 1). 
Respondents felt the intervention of the Ministry was excessive and it stifled innovativeness, especially 
in councils’ debates. As a result most urban councils were reduced to bankruptcy and inability to provide 
social goods and services to the ratepayers. The overall degeneration was evidenced by poor roads, 
lack of clean water, lack of capacity to collect garbage and decay of other sectors. 
TABLE 1: OUTSTANDING RATES AND CHARGES BY GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES TO THE CITY OF HARARE AS AT 30 JUNE 2004 
Ministry  Amount owed (Z$) 
Foreign Affairs  70 870 303.36 
Agriculture  36 800 680.57 
Air Force  375 387 068.98 
Defence  323 736 095.76 
Industry and Commerce  2 069 112.23 
Education, Sport and Culture  364 458 054.67 
Finance  2 026 358.47 
Health and Child Welfare  323 706 706. 65 
Home Affairs  3 628 598. 27 
ZRP  497 782 903. 48 
Information  10 564 892. 28 
Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs  312 143 252.32 
Mines  6 294 898.95 
Presidents Office  15 530 664.20 
Transport and Communications  45 088 237.77 
ZINWA  1 192 793 689.79 
Total  3 582 881 517.75 
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Non-payments, inflation and their effect 
The neglect to pay urban councils can be viewed as one way towards crippling local government in the 
country. Also there was reduction of grants given to councils. Table 2 illustrates decrease in the money 
given for the Public Service Investment Programme (PSIP). This seriously undermined the revenue 
base for most urban councils in the country when, in effect, they have had a tradition of enormous 
dependency  on  various  forms  of  grants.  Increasing  costs,  inflation  and  devaluation  of  currency 
worsened the problem especially to the detriment of construction projects.   
TABLE 2: THE DECLINING PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROGRAMME (1997-2000) 






Bindura Municipality  16 025 000  9 759 000  3 600 000 
Bulawayo City Council  67 255 000  21 229 000  9 009 000 
Chegutu Municipality  26 160 000  3 740 000  1 250 000 
Chinhoyi Municipality  28 040 000  27 520 000  5 500 000 
Chitungwiza Municipality  23 151 000  22 520 000  2 000 000 
Gwanda Municipality  10 930 000  4 670 000  1 500 000 
Gweru City Council  22 900 000  22 809 000  000 000 000 
Harare City Council  67 016 000  23 870 000  5 220 000 
Hwange Local Board  5 000 000  3 727 000  1 375 000 
Kadoma City Council  11 270 000  19 030 000  1 250 000 
Kariba Municipality  17 260 000  33 000 000  18 714 000 
Karoi Town Council  12 950 000  7 750 000  1 400 000 
Kwekwe City Council  11 450 000  10 926 000  1 500 000 
Morondera Municipality  20 082 000  56 893 000   18 000 000 
Masvingo Municipality  9 600 000  15 565 000  2 500 000 
Mutare City Council   22 920 000  47 736 000  11 637 000 
Norton Town Council  21 470 000   22 840 000  9 600 000 
Redcliff Municipality  25 610 000  18 000 000  11 185 000 
Rusape Town Council  12 039 000  12 125 000  1 600 000 
Ruwa Local Board     2 500  000  2 000 000 
Shurugwi T own Council  8 835 000  8 765 000  1 600 000 
Victoria Falls Municipality  23 500 000  36 600 000  11 546 000 
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The defeat of democracy in council business 
Figure 1 shows the responses on the levels of democracy in doing council business.  In response to the 
question  on  the  levels  of  external  influence,  29  respondents  (85.3%)  felt  the  levels  of  external 
interference was high as opposed to 5 (14.7%) who indicated that  the level was  low. Twenty-two 
respondents (64.7%) stated that autonomy of councillors in conducting their business was low while 12 
(35.3%) felt it was high.  On local participation in the conduct of council business, 20 (58.8%) felt 
participation was low while 14 (41.2%) believed it was high.  On the level of council debates 19(55.9%) 
respondents indicated that it was low while 15 (44.1%) felt it was high. This result generally confirms the 
idea that there is too much outside interference in the management of councils. It became obvious then 
that the levels of debate in the full council meetings were restrained by such external forces. About 6 
(54.5%) councillors and 12 (52.2%) employees confirmed that levels debates are low/limited. This result 
is  also  consistent  with  earlier  findings  that  the  level  of  consultation,  initiatives  and  participation  in 
decision- making was low.  Restrained council debates have a strong bearing on policy formulation; it 










































1 – Levels of external influence 
2 – Autonomy of councillors in conducting their business 
3 – Local participation in the conduct of council business 
4 – Level of debates 
5 – Level of consultation 
6 – Encouragement of initiative 
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Arbitrary political appointments  
The  introduction  of  the  offices  of  District  Administrators  (DA)  and  governors  in  urban  areas  was 
highlighted by some mayors felt as a strategy by government to interfere with their operations and to 
force them also to report to ZANU (PF) appointed functionaries (The Financial Gazette, 2003). It was 
revealed that such offices were not provided for in  the Urban Councils Act (GoZ, 1996) and also 
unconstitutional.  The  firing  of  a  council  according  to  a  Deputy  Secretary  in  the  Ministry  of  Local 
Government was the last and drastic option taken when services have deteriorated to levels where the 
ratepayers cannot get value for their money. In addition the reason could be rampant corruption or 
generally councillors can be fired for mismanagement of the activities of the councils. To some extent 
the majority, if not all, urban councils that have been fired by the Minister were dominated by MDC 
councillors and /or were under MDC Mayors. Also a number of MDC Mayors have been fired and 
replaced ZANU-PF loyalists. At the time of gathering data for the report ( January 2008), Commissions 
were managing Harare and Mutare; the Mayor of Chitungwiza was fired and replaced by a ZANU (PF) 
Party official. One respondents observed that a big number of the appointed commissioners were not 
experts in local government issues, only appointed on patronage bases.  Thus their target may not be 
the society they are supposed to serve but to satisfy selfish ends of national politicians. 
Abolition of executive mayorship 
In 2008, the government abolished the post of the executive mayor post replacing it with the old system 
of the ceremonial mayor. It was envisaged by the central government that such a move would reduce 
the powers of the mayors as provided in the Urban Councils Act. The central government cited abuse of 
power by the mayors as the chief trigger to this decision. However, a number of antagonists to the move 
indicated that mayorship was synonymous urban governance which domain has now been taken over 
by  the  opposition  MDC.  According  to  them,  the  move  was  nothing  but  a  coup  de’tat  against  the 
democratically elected mayors in various urban centres of the country.  Some mentioned that the matter 
constituted a constitutional agenda.  
All the snippets are evidence to indicate that in Zimbabwe central government has been using various 
tactics to involve itself in local affairs hence a recentralization tendency. In this aspect, the continuous 
deterioration  of  goods  and  services  and  the  infrastructure  in  the  urban  centres  has  left  many 
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5. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS  
The research established that the Zimbabwe’s constitution is not explicit on the definition of the powers 
that should be assumed by the Minister of Local Government. Have the minister’s powers been clearly 
stated  in  the  constitution,  a  lot  of  tampering  with  the  local  government  systems,  structures  and 
operations without calling for referenda.  The Urban Council’s Act gives the minister this kind of power 
(GoZ,  1996).  RBZ  (2004:14)  explains  that  the  local  government  system  in  Zimbabwe  “…is  not 
entrenched in the constitution as in other countries like South Africa.”  Thus the minister is not held 
constitutionally  accountable  for  his  or  her  actions.  This  explains  why,  in  a  bid  to  alleviate  urban 
problems in the country there have been kick-backs in the form of conflicts and mistrusts in the councils’ 
chambers.  Antagonists  to  the  minister’s  actions  of  interfering  into  the  local  affairs  of  urban  local 
authorities have cited suffocation of democracy as the major development given the stifling of councils’ 
debates and initiatives. Poor service delivery, weak administrative institutions, ineffective and efficient 
councils and unaccountable and corrupt urban councils systems have been the result of such frustrating 
of the representative voice of the citizens.  
Furthermore, the research revealed that council business was dominated by party politics thus adding 
confusion in the platform of the apolitical and neutral role of local government as it addresses the needs 
of the citizens.  Although the council comprises of politicians (mayors and councillors) and technocrats, 
in conducting council business a value-neutral position should be adopted. This was not the case in 
most council meeting. A number of respondents posited that during business sessions valuable time 
was spent on arguments based on political differences rather than spent that time on harmonizing 
useful  and  progressive  ideas  that  could  be  nurtured  to  bring  about  the  development  of  these 
municipalities. Respondents felt that the commissions (e.g. for Harare, Chitungwiza and Mutare city 
councils) were supposed to be transitional hence temporary stopgaps but in all cases they turned out to 
be permanent features in local government as they had their contracts serially renewed before any 
elections  were  held.  It  was  stressed  that  though  legal,  the  commissioners  did  not  represent  any 
constituents like councillors as they were not democratically elected. Despite the fact that the Urban 
Councils Act stipulates a time period for which a council can be administered by a commission (GoZ, 
1996), the Minister of Local Government refused or ignored stakeholders’ request for the holding of 
council election within the stipulated six months. The argument cited is that during this period under 
discussion, there was no rule of law in the management of urban councils. Yet, the election of councils 
and their independent and democratic functioning allow for continuity and development of experience in 
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UNCHS (1996: 161) has stressed that deconcentration is the transfer of functions, but not power, from a 
central unit to a local administrative office. This is typical of the type of decentralization operative in 
Zimbabwe’s  urban  councils’  administration  where  the  central  government  falsely  portrays  it  as 
devolution. Devolution to urban councils works only in principle and on paper.  Failure to promote good 
governance at national level has indirectly impacted on the low structures of government like urban 
councils. Stakeholders, especially the ratepayers raised the following, inter alia, issues as failed areas 
due to the recentralisation tendencies by the central government: poor refuse collection, poor street 
lighting, increase in pot-holes, bursting sewerage systems, and poor purified drinking water. As such the 
ratepayers  expressed  lack  of  confidence  in  their  urban  councils.  Some  of  them  (the  ratepayers) 
determined to resist payment of rates and taxes. In a number of urban councils such protests did occur. 
6. WAY FORWARD AND CONCLUSION  
To  improve  the  urban  governance  situation  in  Zimbabwe  researchers  put  across  a  number  of 
suggestions including. 
￿  Amending the Constitution of Zimbabwe so that it lucidly set parameters of the powers of the 
Minister of Local Government. This will help streamline the actions of the political figure, also 
giving democracy room for the betterment of the citizenry.  
￿  Formulating legislations and statutory instruments that are impulsive for the minister to put 
stakeholders’ participation before changing an existing law or taking any decision or action in 
the name of public interest. This has the effect of establishing the rule of law or the principles 
of democracy and good governance. 
￿  Clearly defining and sticking to  the set provisions of the  law with respects to the firing 
incompetent councils, hiring commissioners and making new elections for councils in a more 
transparent and accountable manner. This helps in confidence building by the citizens in 
view of their urban managers. In conducting councils’ business the councils’ by-laws and 
resolution need to followed. These determine the council’s vision, mission and projects. 
￿  Engaging serious stakeholders’ participation in all matter affecting their day to day living 
including  food  security,  transportation,  water  provision,  housing,  to  name  but  a  few. 
Representative  democracy  in  the  council  chambers  should  be  complemented  by  direct 
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￿  The government must strive to make devolution work in urban local authorities. This will 
reduce the burden of centralised co-ordination. Effort will then be devoted to guidance of 
local  authorities  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  citizens  in  keeping  with  constitutional  and 
legislative requirements.  
The above analysis and policy suggestions show that Zimbabwe has a great task in restoring the 
confidence of the ordinary citizen in the institution of the urban council. With a minimum of interference, 
most urban authorities have a great potential to serve their residence. However, the period from about 
2000 to date was a trying time not only for the urban local authorities but also the central government, 
the generality of the population and the voluntary sector which was also trying to bridge the gaps 
created by the political impasses and the economic meltdown. Thanks to the setting up of the ‘inclusive 
government’ which is in the business of restoring sanity to urban governance, among other things in the 
country. If there is anything that the constitutional amendment can do for the people of Zimbabwe, it is 
the stressing on decentralisation and reversing unwarranted (re)centralisation tendencies. 
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